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Comparative interpretation standards in uniform international law
Maren Heidemann*
Introduction
Interpretation standards in international law
One of the most important mechanisms in the successful use and application of international law are 
interpretation standards. These are contained partly in the individual rules themselves, partly in 
special international legislation on the matter and partly in the law, customs and practices of the 
country or institution where the uniform law is applied. So, while uniform law is specifically made 
by supranational legislatures or institutions to address cross-border affairs such as private and 
commercial contracts and their performance, its practical usefulness and success depends on the 
way this law is interpreted on its application. Will the interpretation give due consideration to the 
underlying purpose of the uniform law or will it provide an obstacle to the transaction performed 
under the law and its adjudication? Interpretation standards exist autonomously within many 
uniform instruments but they also form an important part of national legal doctrine in most 
domestic jurisdictions. From this simultaneous presence of potentially differing standards conflicts 
can arise. Such conflicts are often settled in a way indicating a weak position of the international 
law itself. Often, domestic legal positions are given preference over the intended solutions of the 
international legal instrument by way of the interpretation standard and method. In this way, the true 
purposes of the specialised uniform law cannot be realised and the international transaction lacks 
the legal protection that it was awarded by an international rule maker by way of the relevant 
international legal instrument. This paper will explain how interpretation standards have evolved in 
uniform law over the past decades, how they can be enforced and what a desirable continuation of 
this process and a desirable standard may look like.
Comparative method
Uniform international law poses a challenge in that a comprehensive description of available 
interpretation standards can only be effected by comparing the fragments contained in each 
instrument. By carrying out a horizontal comparison at international level in contrast to the more 
common comparison of laws across separate jurisdictions the fragments can be grouped both 
according to a timeline and according to the creator of each instrument, the respective law maker. 
This allows conclusions as to the intentions and the potential behind each of the different rules and 
a projection into the future based on these observations. A precondition for this horizontal 
comparison is the fact that the uniform instruments are legally separate from each other due their 
allocation to the supranational law making sphere. No legal link exists between them and none of 
them has any effect beyond its immediate scope and group of signatory states, ie materially and 
territorially. Therefore the fragments of interpretation standard can be looked at individually and 
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compared due to the difference between these standards and the separateness of the legal instrument 
containing them. At the same time, the separateness of the instruments necessitates a comparative 
exercise in order to gain a comprehensive view of available forms of interpretation, application 
standards and methods in uniform international law allowing the development of a modern 
approach to the use of such tailor made law.
In this way the comparative method can be a basis for law reform and legal evolution.
Uniform international law - terminology
Uniform international law as the object of this paper needs an introduction. With the European 
Union on the brink of enacting the first substantive law on contracts for all Member States,1  a 
recapitulation of the nature of this law and the international setting into which it may be ‘born’ 
seems appropriate.
The expression international law most commonly denotes public international law which 
traditionally consists of treaties between states and customary rules of law as well as case law 
addressed to and binding for states. The complementary expression ‘private international law’ 
however is traditionally domestic law directing issues arising from civil matters2 with a crossborder 
element within each country. Efforts to harmonise such rules among countries have led to 
international treaties establishing conflict rules.3 The underlying rules of private and contract law, 
however, have been the subject of international legal instruments of a varying legal nature only for 
a comparatively short time within legal history, hardly spanning a century. This particular type of 
legal instrument is the main focus of interest in this paper. The expression ‘uniform law’ has been 
coined in connection with the earliest efforts to create substantive rules of private law, namely 
contract law which eventually manifested in the Hague Conventions of the 1st of July 1964 on 
International Sale of Goods and the Formation of the Contract of Sale.4 While it may appear to be a 
common place that such a law is uniform, this convention and its successors distinguish itself from 
traditional treaties by providing substantive rules of contract law directly addressed to and 
applicable by the private parties of a contract whereas the traditional treaties regulated the actions of 
states. At the same time of course ULIS is a convention, a traditional treaty, as is the 1980 Vienna 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, CISG, and a number of other modern conventions 
regulating private law issues relating to a range of international trade contracts and their 
performance, for example shipping, including air and road transport.5 Uniform legal instruments 
which have been adopted as treaties therefore also bind states and their actions. If they have not 
undergone the formal procedure of adoption and ratification they may not be binding on the 
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signatory states in the same way as treaties but they are still uniform international instruments as 
they still have the quality of law.6 All these instruments seek to provide a uniform source of law to 
international private actors. The expression uniform law has therefore come to denote legal 
instruments providing substantive rules of private law in the form of a traditional instrument of 
international law. Uniform international law is therefore intended to formally govern matters of a 
civil or commercial nature with a varying degree of binding force on an international, non-domestic 
level.
Interpretation
In the application of any law interpretation of its individual rules is an integral part. Domestic legal 
systems have developed their own methods and practices over long periods of time. These differ 
often quite substantially between the legal systems as they have arisen from various historic and 
political origins. As they form part of the legal identity of those different legal systems, not only are 
stipulations on interpretation needed in each uniform instrument, but these are also subject to 
dissent in drafting and adoption negotiations just as many other core provisions such as 
performance rules or remedies. At the same time, uniformity of international law requires a degree 
of uniform application in addition to a uniform source. In some areas this can be provided by a 
centralised adjudication system such as that of the European Union, the International Court of 
Justice in the Hague or the dispute settling mechanism of the World Trade Organisation, WTO. In 
many other areas such a system does not exist or is fragmented. The CISG relies solely on an 
informal database offering reference to domestic court decisions on international sales contracts 
using CISG.7
To guide the application of uniform law interpretation provisions have been included into each of 
them. These can be compared and a development observed over the years. Whether this has resulted 
into an international doctrine of interpreting and applying uniform law which could be called a 
method or whether it would be possible and desirable to use such a method is the subject of this 
paper.
Sources of interpretation rules
Treaties
General rules for the interpretation of treaties are provided by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, VCLT.8 Concluded under the auspices of the United Nations the VCLT is a treaty 
itself and contains in its Arts 31-33 provisions about the application and interpretation of treaties. 
These govern the application of all those uniform laws which have amounted to treaties such as the 
CISG, the ULIS, and many conventions created by UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL, for example the 
conventions on factoring and leasing concluded in Ottawa in the 1980s. Together with the 
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individual provision contained in those treaties they might constitute the basis for an international 
method of interpretation. The next step would then be to ask if this amounts to a legal obligation for 
the lawyers and parties using the instruments and whether these extend to uniform international 
instruments which are not formal treaties, for example the UNIDROIT Principles of Commercial 
Contracts, UPICC,9 or indeed the proposed CESL10 which is meant to be an EU regulation and not a 
treaty. 
Current rules and methods in uniform international law
It is possible to discern three types of interpretation standards in uniform law instruments, having 
evolved during the decades of their successive creation.
The first type was created in the course of the creation of ULIS in The Hague. The second type can 
be established in the 1980 Vienna Convention on the Law of International Sales, CISG, created by 
UNIDROIT and the UN. The third is a combination of both, where the interpretation rule is 
extended by reference to the ‘object and purpose’ of the convention and can be observed in the 
UNIDROIT conventions of the 1980s, namely the so-called ‘Ottawa’ conventions.
The interpretation provisions of the VCLT apply generally to all of the aforementioned instruments 
and possibly beyond. They could be classed as a forth or general standard.
The interpretation standards generally consist of two components - the actual interpretation of 
individual rules of a legal instrument and a method providing for how to proceed in case no answer 
can be derived from those rules for the matter in hand. I want to refer to these in the following as an 
interpretation rule and a method.
The first type of standard in ULIS consists of only the method, the other two both include a method 
and an interpretation rule while the VCLT itself does not provide for a method. I want to look at 
these rules in detail now and compare them with each other. After that I want to discuss what this 
means for the development of a consistent and meaningful interpretation standard for current 
uniform international law.
The first type – Art 17 ULIS
ULIS was the instrument first adopted (in 1964) even before the VCLT in 1969. 
Art 17 ULIS reads:
Questions concerning matters governed by the present Law which are not expressly settled therein shall be 
settled in conformity with the general principles on which the present Law is based.
The absence of an actual interpretation rule providing how questions ought to be decided under the 
present law or guidelines of how to use the rules makes Art 17 look like making the second step 
before the first. However, it has to be borne in mind that this type of legal instrument and with it any 
type of application standard was the first of its kind and the result of many years of academic work 
and diplomatic negotiation. Interpretation and application of the law is not often subject to express 
legislation in many domestic legal systems, so Art 17 ULIS sets uniform law apart form domestic 
sales law. Art 17 ULIS introduces ‘general principles on which the present Law is based’ as a 
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reference point. This requires not only the identification and acceptance of those general principles, 
it also presupposes the prior exhaustion of meaning derived from the whole of the set of rules, 
conceiving of the rules as a comprehensive instrument, not as a ‘toolbox’ as is often advertised 
presently and practiced all too often.11 Art. 17 ULIS requires the user to establish whether or not a 
matter is expressly settled in the convention before he or she moves on to the ‘general principles’ on 
which ULIS is based. Leaving the question aside for a moment, of what these general principles 
might be, I want to look at the other available standards and compare to each other before 
evaluating the usability of each of the standards.
The second type – CISG
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS (1980) [CISG]
Article 7 
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need 
to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade. 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be 
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in 
conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
The wording of this article displays a method article preceded by an interpretation rule in the above 
explained sense.
The method article in the second para of all these articles commences identical to ULIS and then 
continues on to add another step to this method. In addition to referring to underlying principles 
these conventions point to private international law to establish the next point of reference to decide 
a question arising under the conventions. This point of reference will be a national law under 
current private international law rules. There even seems to be a preferred hierarchy between the 
domestic law summoned by way of private international law rules and the underlying principles. 
Only in the absence of the underlying principles should domestic law be used. It is not, however, a 
clear progression of first exhausting possible answers from underlying principles and then 
proceeding to domestic law. It is only if no underlying principles can be found the applying lawyer 
or party is to resort the national law pointed out by conflict rules. It is unclear if this is meant to be a 
choice of terminology equalling a lack of result from underlying principles with the absence of the 
same or the assumption that conventions can be drafted without underlying principles. Assuming 
underlying principles in the first place seems to forbid the assumption of their absence.
The third type – Ottawa
In 1988, UNIDROIT called a diplomatic conference in Ottawa where two conventions on 
international leasing and factoring were adopted. These contain both an interpretation rule and a 
method which are identical to the wording of CISG, but they also introduce the important additional 
reference to the ‘object and purpose’ of the convention. This component will be looked at in more 
detail below.
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UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring (Ottawa, 28 May 1988)
Article 4 
1. - In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its object and purpose as set forth in the 
preamble, to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the 
observance of good faith in international trade. 
2. - Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be 
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in 
conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing (Ottawa, 28 May 1988)
Article 6 
1. - In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its object and purpose as set forth in the 
preamble, to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the 
observance of good faith in international trade. 
2. - Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be 
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in 
conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
The 1969 VCLT
For ease of reference the relevant text of the VCLT is also included here despite its greater length 
compared to the above cited convention articles.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 12
SECTION 3.	
 INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
Article 31 General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes:
(a)	
 any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b)	
 any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a)	
 any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions;
(b)	
 any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c)	
 any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Article 32 - Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from 
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the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to 
article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.
Article 33 - Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages
1.When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative 
in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a 
particular text shall prevail.
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated 
shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.
3.The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.
4.Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of 
the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 
does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and 
purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.
It can be seen that the significance of the object and purpose of an international legal instrument, 
private or public, has been part of the general interpretation process introduced by the VCLT in its 
Art. 31, along with other elements of Art. 31, repeated in the later conventions. The fact that 
reference to object and purpose is not expressly included in ULIS does not mean that the standard 
was unknown or dismissed by the drafters at the time of drafting ULIS which of course coincided 
with or preceded that of the VCLT. Equally, while the VCLT codified a lot of customary law the 
contents of Art 31 should not be taken as an agreed standard of customary law without more. Too 
great are the differences in practices between different legal systems so that, eventually, the VCLT 
provided a common basis among the signatory states.13
Legal nature of the sources
The above listed examples of uniform international law belong to one category of source of law - 
they are international treaties, conventions adopted at diplomatic conferences and ratified 
subsequently within each signatory state under national constitutional procedures. They therefore 
have the quality of formal law even though this may not lead to identical consequences within each 
signatory state as ratification is followed by varying types of implementation procedures.14 So, here 
we can now see the peculiarity of uniform international law as described here which starts its life as 
a treaty clearly assigned public law qualities and addressed to states but at the same time providing 
substantive rules of contract law to private parties. According to the varying implementation 
procedures, the treaties then may turn into directly applicable domestic rules of contract law 15 
applicable to international contracts while they simultaneously remain treaties at supranational level 
and continue to bind states. What is the role of interpretation rules in this situation? As far as the 
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interpretation rules arise from treaty law as the VCLT provisions do they are clearly addressed to 
states and stipulate how they should interpret the provisions of conventions they conclude. But do 
they also bind private parties who conclude private contracts under the treaties? Do they bind 
judges when they adjudicate disputes arising out of such contracts?
It is clear that uniform international law can appear in many shapes and forms depending on who is 
using and applying it. The VCLT rules do not distinguish, however, or specify to what situation they 
apply - only when states apply the uniform laws, when private parties negotiate their contracts or 
when state judges apply the uniform law conventions?
The first case, states applying uniform law conventions, is – due to the subject matter of the 
conventions – the least likely scenario. Uniform international law is indeed made by state parties 
under public international law including the VCLT to be applied by private parties and by domestic 
judges to their private albeit transnational contracts.
Due to the inherent discrepancy between the motivations of those two distinct participants in the 
global trade and negotiations of uniform contract law regimes the object and purpose of any of 
these instruments as mentioned in the VCLT and in the 1988 Ottawa conventions in my view play 
the most crucial part in the interpretation and application of any uniform international law.16
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that there are uniform instruments that are not conventions. 
A number of so called Model Laws (UNCITRAL) and other ‘general principles’17  have been 
prepared and published by institutes and scholarly groups with different forms of mandates and 
authority. These sets of rules can be said to have the quality of law even if they are not formally 
enacted under any national legislative procedure. Some of them have served as a model for law 
reform such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on international arbitration. This does not confer the 
force of law directly onto the Model Law though, but all these uniform laws are available and 
applied as a legal framework for international contracts and aspects surrounding their performance. 
They play a role in international arbitration and sometimes even in state court procedures.18
All uniform international law can be made contractual content by the parties and would 
subsequently itself be subject to the national interpretation rules of the law applicable by virtue of 
the general conflict law.
It is therefore clear that one standard for public international law treaties cannot fit all the various 
types of uniform international law. In addition, the VCLT as the only general standard applying to 
all treaties, does not provide a method.19
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underlying principles pointed to in the methods outlined above on encountering an internal gap. The article itself does not seem to be intended to 
establish a method in the above described sense.
Both treaty and non-treaty uniform laws, or non-state laws as they shall be called here, therefore 
require and incorporate individual interpretation rules. As can be seen from the above list, these 
rules are not identical across the board and may not even have any legal effect beyond each of the 
uniform international laws. It is for this reason that a comparison is carried out here in order to 
establish if and by what legal mechanism a general standard is effective for all types of uniform law 
and why one would be needed and if so which.
Another quite different form of law is suggested by the Draft Proposal for a European Sales Law, 
CESL.20 Being a European regulation it is part of the internal secondary law of a supranational 
organisation. According to the established case law and the EU treaties regulations are directly 
applicable in the Member States (MS) without needing a separate implementation process as 
treaties often do. CESL, however, introduces a novel form of legal structure to the regulation by 
offering the actual substantive rules of CESL in the form of an Annexe (I) and by declaring in the 
Explanatory Memorandum and Recital that this Annex be part of the national contract laws of the 
MS thus avoiding the need for a choice of law in the classic sense even though CESL is ‘optional’, 
ie only operational upon a choice by the parties. There is much debate around how this choice may 
operate21 and especially how the ‘unchosen’ CESL will operate as part of that MS whose law is not 
‘chosen’ by the parties to govern their contract but whose CESL is deemed to govern the contract in 
its capacity as the consumer’s habitual residence’s law.22 It remains to be seen whether or not 
CESL will be enacted and what the judgement of the judiciary in the MS will be about this point. 
CESL deserves a mention in this context, however, due to its interesting range of elements of 
interpretation standards contained in Recital 29 of the Preamble and Article 4 of the Annexe I to the 
Regulation, see the text below in the next section. The elaborate structure of the whole instrument 
may have been developed after the model of the ULF which also has the operative text in its 
Annexe, a method also used in UK legislation such as the Contracts Applicable Law Act 1980. But 
as CESL is neither intended to be an international convention nor a domestic act of parliament the 
choice of structure is certainly unusual and of doubtful legal effect.
Non-state uniform law
To complete the set of examples of interpretation standards, I want to look at three non -state 
uniform laws issued by three different sources, UNIDROIT in Rome,23  UNCITRAL24 and the EU 
Commission.
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21 See for example Sixto A Sanchez-Lorenzo, “Common European Sales Law: Some Critical Remarks” 5 Journal of Private International Law (2013) 
191-217, 216 and Simon Whittaker, “The Proposed ‘Common European Sales Law’: Legal Framework and the Agreement of the Parties”, 75 Modern 
Law Review (2012)(4) 578-605.
22  Art. 6 (2) 2nd sentence Rome I Regulation;  see A Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford Private International Law 
Series, OUP, Oxford New York 2008), 383 for general discussion of the role of ‘unchosen’ law in the context of the doctrine of mandatory rules of 
law.
23 Institute for the Unification of Private Law.
24 The United Nation’s Commision for International Trade Law.
The UPICC
The method article Art. 17 ULIS is almost repeated in the Art. 1.6. (2) of the UPICC25 which reads
The 
ARTICLE 1.6 (Interpretation and supplementation of the Principles) 
(1) In the interpretation of these Principles, regard is to be had to their international character and to their 
purposes including the need to promote uniformity in their application. 
(2) Issues within the scope of these Principles but not expressly settled by them are as far as possible to be 
settled in accordance with their underlying general principles.
The method is somewhat toned down by the addition of ‘as far as possible’ into the phrase. The 
article also introduces the actual interpretation standard including part of the ‘object and purpose’ 
element.
The UNCITRAL Model Law on international arbitration (as revised 2006)
Article 2 A.	

International origin and general principles (As adopted by the Commission at its thirty-ninth session, in 
2006)
(1) In the interpretation of this Law, regard is to be had to its international origin and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Law which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled 
in conformity with the general principles on which this Law is based.
The interpretation rule is reminiscent of CISG, the method rule of ULIS. Interesting to note is the 
replacement of the reference to the ‘international character’ of rules by its ‘international origin’ to 
be observed. Due to its recent inclusion in to the Model Law it is fair to conclude that this standard 
represents a modern take on the catalogue of rules on interpretation and method seen so far. It may 
even be representative of a desirable standard as discussed below.
The draft regulation on a Common European Sales Law, CESL
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a Common 
European Sales Law, COM(2011) 635 final
Preamble, Recital
(29) Once there is a valid agreement to use the Common European Sales Law, only the Common European 
Sales Law should govern the matters falling within its scope. The rules of the Common European Sales Law 
should be interpreted autonomously in accordance with the well-established principles on the interpretation 
of Union legislation. Questions concerning matters falling within the scope of the Common European Sales 
Law which are not expressly settled by it should be resolved only by interpretation of its rules without 
recourse to any other law. The rules of the Common European Sales Law should be interpreted on the basis 
of the underlying principles and objectives and all its provisions.
12
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Regulation, Article 11
Consequences of the use of the Common European Sales Law
Where the parties have validly agreed to use the Common European Sales Law for a contract, only the 
Common European Sales Law shall govern the matters addressed in its rules. Provided that the contract was 
actually concluded, the Common European Sales Law shall also govern the compliance with and remedies 
for failure to comply with the pre-contractual information duties.
Annex I
SECTION 2 APPLICATION
Article 4
Interpretation
1. The Common European Sales Law is to be interpreted autonomously and in accordance with its objectives 
and the principles underlying it.
2. Issues within the scope of the Common European Sales Law but not expressly settled by it are to be settled 
in accordance with the objectives and the principles underlying it and all its provisions, without recourse to 
the national law that would be applicable in the absence of an agreement to use the Common European 
Sales Law or to any other law.
3. Where there is a general rule and a special rule applying to a particular situation within the scope of the 
general rule, the special rule prevails in any case of conflict.
The rules in these three instruments have been drafted drawing upon experience with preceding 
uniform law. While the UPICC use only one article for the core interpretation provisions, the CESL 
displays a more expanded structure. In fact, it spreads out its rules on interpretation over all those 
components that are mentioned in Art. 31 (2) VCLT as possible sources of meaning in an individual 
rule, it consists of a preamble, the regulation itself and of two annexes, one of them containing the 
actual sales law. Whether or not the drafters had the VCLT in mind when designing the instrument 
is questionable however as CESL is not to be a treaty but secondary law within the EU. 
Comparison of the interpretation rules and methods
It is now time to look at the different standards displayed in this array of uniform laws in more 
detail and compare them to each other.
Method 
It is possible to derive the impression from the wording in each of the rules quoted above that there 
are two general types of rules, one that is created for the purposes of political agreement at 
diplomatic conferences and one that is created for informal use by the legal community without 
state sanctioning or formal approval by the legislative process. This does not apply to the first 
example of its kind, ULIS, which contains only a basic rule, or compared with subsequent models, 
almost a torso.
The rule in ULIS was expanded in all subsequent treaties by the continuation of the phrase pointing 
the user to ‘the rules applicable by virtue of private international law’ which effectively de lege lata 
means national law.26 The other models that have not been formally adopted do not contain this 
prescription but limit themselves to stipulating the underlying principles of the instrument as a 
supplementary means of interpretation. They do not, however, comment on any further possible 
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step to establish external sources of law in order to interpret a rule of a given uniform law. For 
example, the UPICC could stipulate that rules of ULIS or CISG can be consulted to find an answer 
to a problem under the UPICC if none can be found within UPICC themselves, or it could point to 
‘general rules of international law’. This is not a chosen route, though, and it is not difficult to see 
that it would not be practical to specify such a course of action. Not only is the scope of UPICC 
different from the sales law conventions and therefore reference to them would be arbitrary but 
‘general principles of international law’ might either be deemed to be too vague by a user or they 
may quite to the contrary be taken for granted and therefore not need specific inclusion in the 
uniform law in question. The question of where to turn upon encountering a ‘matter not expressly 
settled’ in a uniform international law is one of general doctrine at international level and currently 
therefore effectively left to be decided by the background of each individual applying the 
instrument. It is the purpose of this paper to contribute to the formation of such a doctrine in order 
to decrease the uncertainty connected with this application process and increase the ease of use of 
uniform international law.
Example
An example may illustrate the significance and functionality of the method article in uniform laws.
When the UPICC were first published in 1994, UNIDROIT held a number of conferences in 
different countries to introduce and discuss the new set of rules. One item on the list was the rules 
on payment obligations. The payment rule in Art. 7.2.1. UPICC was heavily criticised by a scholar 
as providing for an overly rigid payment obligation and therefore for being incompatible with most 
European legal systems.27 The argument was derived from the fact that Art.7.2.1 other than Art. 
7.2.2. on non-monetary obligations, does not contain any express limitations. 
(Performance of monetary obligation)
Where a party who is obliged to pay money does not do so, the other party may require payment.
(Performance of non-monetary obligation)
Where a party who owes an obligation other than one to pay money does not perform, the other party may 
require performance, unless
(a) performance is impossible in law or in fact;
(b) performance or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably burdensome or expensive;
(c) the party entitled to performance may reasonably obtain performance from another source;
(d) performance is of an exclusively personal character; or
(e) the party entitled to performance does not require performance within a reasonable time after it has, or 
ought to have, become aware of the non-performance.
This example provides an opportunity to apply the method article and examine the outcome.
The critique expressed about the above mentioned article results from a comparison of this rule with 
domestic law and legal doctrine and a value judgement. This is of course exceeding a simple 
application to a given case. Has this been done in accordance with Art. 1.6 (2) UPICC? This would 
presuppose that a matter is not expressly settled in the convention. This matter would be the 
limitation to a payment obligation, effectively a defense against the monetary payment obligation or 
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27  I Schwenzer, “Specific Performance and Damages According to the 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts” 1 
European Journal of Law Reform (1998/1999) 289-303.
an excuse for non-payment. The wording of Art. 1.6 (2) already contains part of the answer - it is 
the whole convention which can provide for the solution to a problem, not just the immediate rule 
on its own. The scholar is missing express limitations to the right to performance of monetary 
obligations in the way it is included in Art. 7.2.2. UPICC. Looking at those limitations, however, it 
becomes clear that some of those hardly ever apply to monetary obligations in most legal systems: 
payment cannot become impossible in law or fact or unreasonably burdensome. The rules in Art. 
7.2.2. (a) to (d) are not applicable to payment obligations according to most domestic legal 
viewpoints. On the contrary, payment obligations are often treated quite differently from non-
monetary ones. The fact that the rule is worded differently should as such not be cause for alarm 
therefore. But how are the legitimate defenses and excuses supposed to operate then under the 
UPICC? 
First and foremost, the answer is in the wording of the rule itself. By reading the rule carefully, the 
user is actually following Art. 31 VCLT, referring to the wording of the rule and the ordinary 
meaning of its terms. The rule says ‘...a party, who is obliged to pay money’... This means that Art. 
7.2.1. UPICC does not actually create the obligation but refers to the remedy or right of the obligee. 
The first question to ask would therefore be if the payment obligation has arisen and if it is due. 
This in turn will depend on the contractual terms but also on other provisions within the UPICC. 
To consider that Art. 7.2.1 provides for an unlimited right to performance works only when the 
article is read in total isolation. This, however unfortunate, is exactly the way most provisions in 
uniform laws are used, the above mentioned ‘toolbox approach’. The scholar in her article on 
payment obligations demonstrates a very common attitude maintained by many lawyers towards 
uniform international law. In essence, lawyers tend to use much lesser standards when dealing with 
uniform law than those they would apply when dealing with their own domestic law in which they 
are trained. This mechanism is what interpretation and method rules are designed to counteract.
Comprehensive use of uniform law - autonomous method
As regards the UPICC we can see that the method provided for in Art. 1.6 (2) UPICC is imperfect 
in that it omits an important step in the application process - it does not, neither incidenter nor 
expressly, instruct consultation of the whole of the instrument as a default method of application.
Interestingly, this is now provided by the draft CESL. The interpretation rule in CESL as quoted 
above instructs the user to use ‘all its provisions’,28  but also only the CESL and no other law. So 
there is no method of how to progress if no answer can be found within CESL itself. There is also a 
comment on how to proceed with lacunae intra legem, external gaps which are matters outside 
CESL’s scope. Here, CESL instructs to use the method provided for internal gaps in international 
uniform instruments specifying and limiting the ‘law applicable by virtue of...’ to the EU legislation 
in use in the area of PIL. CESL further provides for the autonomous interpretation method which is 
to be understood as deriving meaning predominantly from the uniform instrument before referring 
to other law. At the same time, CESL astonishes by declaring that it is not to be conceived as 
international law (but domestic contract law) so that the value of this standard for other uniform 
instruments is questionable.29 
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28 CESL Rec. 29 and Art. 4 (2) of the Annexe I read ”... and all its provisions.”
29  The main purpose of this characterisation of CESL seems to be the avoidance of a choice of law in the traditional sense and in particular the 
avoidance of a necessity to modify Art. 6 of the Rome I Regulation which provides for consumer protection rules.
A good illustration of the value of this method however can be derived from an observation of yet 
another category of uniform law - although not commonly referred to as such - double taxation 
conventions (DTCs). These bilateral treaties have been concluded according to the OECD Model 
Tax Convention for the past 4 decades now but there are also a number still in use that preceded this 
Model. The key provision in the OECD Model is Art. 3 (2)30 establishing a rather confusing 
standard for the application and interpretation of these conventions which clearly disregards or even 
derogates from the standards established in the VCLT. Instead of advocating a shared understanding 
of each norm and in particular a method of arriving at a meaning specific to the uniform instrument, 
Art 3 authorises the use of domestic law and interpretation standards in order to fill a term of the 
DTC with meaning. In practice this often leads to the use of this rule much in the way of a conflict 
norm authorising the use of national tax law instead of the international instrument which is after all 
purpose made for the underlying facts in question.31 The development or revelation of a meaning 
specific to an international instrument is what the autonomous interpretation method wants to 
achieve. This has been recognised by the British courts in Fothergill v Monarch Airlines32 where it 
was expressly conceded that the same term can be assigned different meaning depending on its 
context in national or international law.33 They went on further to elaborate on the way to arrive at 
such different meanings in Memec34 where a three tier test was applied to the same term (dividends) 
depending on its ordinary meaning (as required by the VCLT), on its meaning in domestic tax law 
and its meaning in the context of the German-UK DTC. There was even reference to German 
domestic decisions on the understanding of profits derived from limited liability companies even 
though the crucial difference in the understanding of the treatment of such profits under the 
common DTC remained undetected. This difference however stems precisely from the fact the 
German counterpart do not carry out the same diligence when deriving meaning from a term under 
the (same) DTC. The German courts and authorities rely all too readily on a very superficial reading 
of Art II (3) of the Germany-UK DTC35 which is almost identical to the Model Tax article36 and 
classify the term according to domestic tax law only if in doubt. The resulting discrepancy is most 
obvious when looking at the Memec case series but has significance beyond this because it bars an 
appropriate treatment of cases arising under DTCs. There is a modern trend not only in German 
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30 From the OECD Model Tax Convention On Income And Capital [text as it read on 22 July 2010]
Article 3 General Definitions ... 2. As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting 
State, any term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has 
at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, any 
meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other 
laws of that State.
31 I have discussed this in detail elsewhere demonstrating this mechanism using the example of the terms entreprise and silent partner in the German-
UK DTC, M Heidemann and A Knebel, “Double Taxation Treaties: The Autonomous Interpretation Method in German and English Law; as 
Demonstrated by the Case of the Silent Partnership” 38 Intertax (2010) 136-52.
32 [1981] AC 251; [1980] 2 All ER 696; [1980] 3 WLR 209; [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 295, (33 ICLQ 797).
33 It can even have three different meanings in the case of DTCs, see the Memec case series.
34 Memec plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners (IRC) Simons Tax Cases Ch D [1996] STC, 1336 STC1336 (Chancery Division); Memec plc v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners (IRC) CA [1998] STC, 754 
35 Tellingly called ‘Oeffnungsklausel’, opening clause, in German doctrine.
36 The original German-UK DTC was concluded before the OECD Model was published and this article was not amended by recent renegotiation. 
The original 1951 German-US DTC mentioned here, too, was more recently amended, in 1989.
case law37 but also in the wording a recent new DTC between Sweden and Germany where a 
reformed wording38 reflects a more appropriate understanding of the underlying interests and the 
affected parties of DTCs. The new DTC emphasises more clearly the need for the users to derive 
meaning from the convention itself rather than from domestic tax law and it also introduces the idea 
that a taxpayer can have a self standing and enforceable interest to have the convention applied in 
the proper way.39 This clearly shows the mechanism to be observed in the use of uniform law: the 
role of the objects and purposes and the contracting parties. In DTCs the two contracting parties are 
states and the object and purpose of the treaties can be derived from their titles and preambles of the 
conventions. They serve the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of ‘double non-
taxation’ which is tax avoidance or even evasion. It is clear that the former of the two purposes is 
not benefitting the contracting parties but a third party, the tax payer, who is not negotiating and not 
expressly protected by the wording of the resulting treaties. The second aim is not even expressly 
mentioned in the actual rules of the treaties but clearly directly serves the contracting parties. An 
assumption as to whether the interests of the tax payer and the contracting parties are generally at 
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37 With a more recent German-US case, judgement of 17 Oct 2007 by the German Federal Fiscal Court, BFH, Bundesfinanzhof, IR 5/06 confirming 
whether or not an ongoing (mal)practice of the German authorities could have amounted to a subsequent amendment of the German-US DTC in the 
sense of Art. 31 (3) (b) VCLT. It was held the mere non-intervention of the US authorities could not be read as a consensus.
38 Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen mit Schweden (DBA 1992) - (DTC Germany with Sweden, 1992)
Artikel 3 - Article 3 Allgemeine Begriffsbestimmungen (General definitions)
(2)	
 Dieses Abkommen ist bei seiner Anwendung durch beide Vertragsstaaten übereinstimmend aus sich selbst heraus auszulegen. Ein in 
diesem Abkommen nicht definierter Ausdruck hat jedoch dann die Bedeutung, die ihm nach dem Recht des anwendenden Staates zukommt, wenn der 
Zusammenhang dies erfordert und die zuständigen Behörden sich nicht auf eine gemeinsame Auslegung geeinigt haben (Artikel 39 Absatz 3, Artikel 
40 Absatz 3).(An interpretation of this convention is to be derived from the convention itself when applied by both contracting states. A term which is 
not defined in this convention however, has the meaning which it has according to the law of the applying state if the context so requires and if the 
competent authorities have not reached an agreement on a joint interpretation, Art. 39 (3) and Art. 40 (3).)
39 Artikel 39 Konsultation - [general consultations between fiscal authorities]
(1)	
 [comprhensive consultation options]
(2)	
 Die zuständigen Behörden der Vertragsstaaten können im Wege der Konsultation Vereinbarungen treffen, um
a)	
 künftige Zweifel zu klären, für welche Steuern das Abkommen nach seinem Artikel 2 Absatz 3 gilt;
b)	
 festzulegen, wie die Begrenzungsbestimmungen des Abkommens, insbesondere der Artikel 10 bis 12, durchzuführen sind.
(3)	
 Die zuständigen Behörden der Vertragsstaaten können gemeinsam über allgemeine Regelungen beraten, um auf der Grundlage des 
Abkommens den Anspruch der Steuerpflichtigen auf abgestimmte Anwendung des Abkommens in beiden Staaten durch gemeinsame Auslegungen 
oder durch besondere Verfahren zu sichern. [The ...authorities... can conduct joint consultations in order to secure the taxpayer’s right to a co-
ordinated application of the convention in both states by way of joint interpretation or special procedures.]
Artikel 40
Verständigung - [direct conciliation between fiscal authorities initiated by taxpayer]
(1)	
 Ist eine Person der Auffassung, daß Maßnahmen eines Vertragsstaats oder beider Vertragsstaaten für sie zu einer Besteuerung führen oder 
führen werden, die diesem Abkommen nicht entspricht, so kann sie unbeschadet der nach dem innerstaatlichen Recht dieser Staaten vorgesehenen 
Rechtsbehelfe ihren Fall der zuständigen Behörde des Vertragsstaats, in dem sie ansässig ist, oder, sofern ihr Fall von Artikel 38 Absatz 1 erfaßt wird, 
der zuständigen Behörde des Vertragsstaats unterbreiten, dessen Staatsangehöriger sie ist. [A person is entitled to refer his or her case to the 
authorities of his or her state of residence or nationality irrerspective of national procedure if they think that measures taken by one or both 
contracting states will lead to a taxation that does not comply with this convention.]
(2)	
 Hält die zuständige Behörde die Einwendung für begründet und ist sie selbst nicht in der Lage, eine befriedigende Lösung herbeizuführen, 
so wird sie sich bemühen, den Fall durch Verständigung mit der zuständigen Behörde des anderen Vertragsstaats so zu regeln, daß eine dem 
Abkommen nicht entsprechende Besteuerung vermieden wird. Die Verständigungsregelung ist ungeachtet der Fristen des innerstaatlichen Rechts der 
Vertragsstaaten durchzuführen. [If the competent authority considers the compliant justified... they can seek an understanding with... the other 
contracting state, in order to resolve the case in such a way that a taxation that does not comply with this convention is avoided]. [Note the ‘negative’ 
formulation.]
odds presupposes a full discussion of state theory and other empirical data which is not the purpose 
of this paper. Here it is sufficient to highlight the importance of identifying the object and the 
purposes of an international uniform instrument, again according to the VCLT. If these are not in 
line with the declared content of an instrument, be it express or in the underlying principles or 
implied in negotiations and subsequent behaviour (in the sense of the VCLT) the resulting 
interpretation and application methods of such an international treaty or other legal instrument is 
not likely to be consistent or easy for its users.
Referring back to the contract law related uniform international law an observation of their objects 
and purposes reveals a similar potential conflict as in the DTCs. What is the purpose of CISG 
concluded by states and used by private contracting parties? Who benefits from its creation? The 
creators of CISG and its beneficiaries are potentially not identical and not necessarily co-ordinated 
regarding the outcome of CISG’s application. The relationship between the creators of CISG and 
the other uniform laws described above and its beneficiaries’ needs is not self evident and can be 
subject to further discussion. Reference to the preamble often illumines these aims and objectives 
but often also reveals a multitude of objectives which again may be difficult to reconcile such as 
with CESL and therefore stand in the way of a successful and concise interpretation standard.
The desirable interpretation standard - a combination of the fragments
The problems can be tackled using the VCLT as a starting point as this is an overarching standard 
which may allow to extend value beyond its actual scope. This can then be complemented by 
fragments existing in other uniform instruments which have not found their way into the VCLT. As 
the VCLT does not contain a method in the above described sense it will be necessary to expand a 
comprehensive desirable standard for a contemporary use of uniform international law.
Components of such a comprehensive standard should include the observance of the international 
character of the uniform law as it is found in the instruments described above. However, it is 
important to expand the wording to include expressly the international character of its object. The 
object and purpose as a reference point in the VCLT is the second most important component. It can 
be noted from the list above that the wording in the various uniform laws is not identical. 
Sometimes only of one of the two is mentioned as in the UPICC. Both object (the subject matter to 
be regulated in the uniform law) and its purpose (objectives and aims of the legislation) are 
decisively prompted by the international character of the object. This is an element of uniform law 
which remains too often overlooked. On examining the objects and purposes of uniform 
international laws closely, one cannot help noticing that it is often the object itself which is met with 
a degree of ambiguity, sometimes even resistance and suspicion by the creators of the law. It is 
therefore not at all surprising to see that the purposes as they can be deciphered from the express 
content, the underlying principles and the materials referred to in the VCLT reveal a misalignment 
of object and purpose or sometimes several purposes which are incompatible with each other. 
Difficulties and inconsistencies in the interpretation efforts are an unavoidable result. Furthermore, 
the objects to be regulated have themselves often been created by the same legislators who then try 
to contain rather than foster them. This is apparent in the EU where a barrier free internal market 
and politically a borderless society have continuously been created and expanded in the form of the 
‘four freedoms’ and the treaty of Schengen. Work on the draft CESL is the expression of an 
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identified need to regulate cross border contracts for the sale of goods.40 This is the object of the 
uniform law. However, the additional purposes of CESL hamper the attainment of the main purpose 
that would be aligned with the object - the creation of a purpose made law for cross border sales, a 
lex specialis. The purposes of the creators of CESL include staying within the limits of the TFEU,41 
to preserve the status quo of EU PIL (no non-state law to govern he contract, no modification of Art 
6 of the Rome I Regulation), to require no involvement of PIL at all. They go as far as redefining 
the object from a generally understood concept of cross border contract which necessarily contains 
an international element to an EU specific concept with its international element subdued by way of 
a definition42  and explanations in the CESL regulations, the preamble and its Explanatory 
Memorandum.43 Similarly, it can be noted, even though less clearly stated, that states prefer to 
foster resistance and suspicion against cross border tax matters and migration (the objects carrying 
the international element) rather than providing the infrastructure to facilitate such migration by 
way of the DTCs. The driving force for this attitude is of course fear of a loss of income and assets. 
To a degree this partly justified and partly irrational attitude will also apply to the provision of 
international contract law and its free use at the international level where the actual transactions 
take place. It is therefore preferred to transform this tailor made law into domestic law and treat it as 
such. This is effected by implementation and the current prevailing views in the conflict of laws that 
no non-state law, and that includes law made at international level, ie outside the actual state, can 
‘govern’ the contract, only domestic (municipal) law can do that. The states who create international 
law respond simultaneously to two countervailing impulses, that of providing infrastructure for 
international civil and commercial activity (because it is seen as a benefit) and that of restricting it 
(because it is seen as a threat). The drawback of this mechanism is that the law which is specifically 
made for the international object cannot function in the corresponding way, internationally. 
The argument to respond to the prevailing view is the lex specialis rule which says that the more 
specific rule always prevails over the more general. The creators of CESL have included this in their 
draft because it is a commonly practiced doctrine in the application of codified law. With only the 
internal relationship between rules within CESL in mind this general doctrine can support an 
argument in favour of the direct application of uniform international law to the exclusion of national 
laws.
A second pillar of the prevailing doctrine in PIL is the doctrine of mandatory laws as incorporated 
in EU legislation.44 So called mandatory laws overrule the rules of uniform law if they contradict 
each other. When and how this is the case is to be decided by the courts in each individual case and 
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40  I do not mean this in the sense published in the EU Green Paper which aimed at removing obstacles to the internal market in the form of 
differences among MS contract laws which represents the translation of the need for a cross border sales law into the possibilities conveyed onto the 
creators of CESL by the TFEU.
41 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the current legal framework for the EU.
42 Art. 4 CESL Regulation – Article 4 Cross-border contracts
1. The Common European Sales Law may be used for cross-border contracts. 2.For the purposes of this Regulation, a contract between traders is a 
cross-border contract if the parties have their habitual residence in different countries of which at least one is a Member State. 3.For the purposes of 
this Regulation, a contract between a trader and a consumer is a cross-border contract if: (a)either the address indicated by the consumer, the delivery 
address for goods or the billing address are located in a country other than the country of the trader’s habitual residence; and (b)at least one of these 
countries is a Member State....
43 According to CESL’s Explanatory Memorandum, sections 1 and 3.
44 It was first codified in the Rome Convention and is now included in the Rome I Regulation, eg in Art. 3 (3) and (4) and 6 (2).
there are virtually no examples in commercial contract law45 so that the doctrine is purely academic 
and therefore ought to be reviewed. 
Thirdly, the theory of gaps as it is formulated within the above described uniform instruments 
disallows a horizontal cross referencing between uniform laws at international level. On 
encountering an internal gap, there is either no instruction of how to proceed or there is the 
instruction to apply conflict law rules subsequently leading to a domestic system of law. This may 
be the method of choice given that there may not be a suitable uniform law to complement the 
question in hand.46 Another reason for this method is that ‘soft law’ – and this will include treaties 
that are in force but not in the country from whose viewpoint the matter is viewed – is neither 
recognised as domestic not as international law suitable to govern the contract, a reinforcement of 
the prevailing positivist doctrine of the unity of law and state in the conflict of laws.
A desirable interpretation standard should also be the same across all uniform instruments with no 
distinction as to the object’s nature as public or private. It should also include all the three elements 
as discussed above. The rationale behind this is not purely academic but it is the only appropriate 
way of giving effect to the purpose of uniform international law which is to provide rules to govern 
its international object. Domestic law is ill suited to govern these objects due to the inherent 
territorial limitations of jurisdiction and to problems typically arising from international situations 
which are the reason for the uniform law to be created in the first place.47 
The way forward
It has to be acknowledged that political compromise is an inherent element of treaty negotiations. 
This should not deter law makers from the quest for the best law. The controversial issues identified 
above ought to be reviewed and suggestions of a draft universal interpretation standard offered. 
These should not try to evoke the resistance of the prevailing views maintained by the state parties. 
Suggestions should rather be supported by legal arguments taken from accepted standards. These 
come from two sources above all, the VCLT and the lex specialis doctrine. Applying the VCLT may 
even make an interpretation standard enforceable before the courts. The lex specialis doctrine can 
also help to identify the object of the uniform law to be created correctly and this object should 
provide guidance as to the purposes to be pursued with any one instrument and its contents should 
remain aligned with these purposes. If the three components of object, purpose and content cannot 
be aligned the instrument may have to be abandoned rather than contribute to the cementation of 
double standards in international law which cannot be of help in an international community based 
on the rule of law.
Conclusion
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45 The doctrine seems to be predominantly the concern of consumer and labour law.
46 See above.
47 Examples are evidenced by the work of trade associations, international chambers of commerce and arbitration centers around the world providing 
infrastructure effectively for international trade. In the sphere of non-state dispute settlement uniform law has already received a more elaborate 
treatment than in state adjuducation and prevailing doctrine.
At present, de lege lata, we can only create the comprehensive method of interpreting and applying 
uniform international law by way of the comparison of the fragments of method and interpretation 
across uniform laws of different legal nature. 
This situation is the result of almost a century of continuous work in order to provide a functional 
infrastructure at supra- or transnational level to the same degree as international trade and political 
accord was pursued and achieved. Building on these fragments of achievement now scholars, 
practitioners and law makers can make a step forward by gathering and evaluating the pieces and 
redraft them into a universal transnational interpretation standard according to the above discussed 
format.
This should be pursued and supported by a more progressive  legal doctrine in the conflict of laws 
in the interest of a successful integration of a global civil society.
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